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Abstract—Password managers address the usability challenge
of authentication, i.e., to manage the effort in creating, memoris-
ing, and entering complex passwords for an end-user. Offering
features such as creating strong passwords, managing increasing
number of complex passwords, and auto-filling of passwords
for variable contexts, their security is as critical as the assets
being protected by the passwords. Previous security risk analyses
have focused primarily on cloud- and browser-based password
managers, whilst the security risks of local password managers
were left under-explored. Taking a systematic forensic analysis
approach, this paper reports on a case study of three popu-
lar local password managers: KeePass (v2.28), Password Safe
(v3.35.1) and RoboForm (v7.9.12). It revealed risks that either the
master password or the content of the password database could
be found unencrypted in Temp folders, Page files or Recycle bin,
even after applications had been closed. As a consequence, an
attacker or a malware with access to the computer on which the
password managers were running may be able to steal sensitive
information, even though these password managers are meant to
keep the databases encrypted and protected at all times. These
findings point to directions to mitigate the identified risks.
Index Terms—Password Managers; Authentication; Security
Risk; Digital Forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are essential for those with an online presence.
They remain the most common form of authentication for
proving identity and are required to permit users’ legitimate
access to accounts, services, devices, data and networks while
preventing unauthorised access from anybody else.
Typically, each user has an average of 25 online accounts
requiring passwords, and types on average 8 passwords per
day, according to a large-scale study from 2007 [1]. Since
technology growth and innovation is increasing exponen-
tially [2], these numbers are probably already conservative.
Remembering those passwords is affected by many factors,
such as: (i) password complexity – stronger passwords require
high entropy [3], i.e., a certain length, a mixture of characters
and cases, no dictionary words, (ii) password matching –
users need to know which password belongs to which account,
service or device [1], (iii) frequency of use – passwords seldom
used are harder to remember [4], and (iv) frequency of change
– best practices recommend the enforcement of periodic pass-
word changes and check of password history [3]. To cope with
the task of remembering and matching many passwords, users
have to use a variety of strategies. For example, they reuse
passwords whenever possible across different accounts, which
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has a domino side-effect on security [5]; they write them down
or recycle old passwords with small changes [4]; or they use
highly guessable passwords [6]. All these strategies undermine
security in favour of usability.
Thus, password managers have been introduced as “one of
the best ways” to accommodate the trade-off between security
and usability raised by password-based authentication [7].
Users only need to remember one, hopefully strong, master
password or passphrase to access their database of passwords
and corresponding user names, account numbers, credit card
numbers or similar information needed for authentication [3].
Therefore, it is no surprise that the password managers are
becoming one of the best practices among individuals and
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) [8]. However, pass-
word managers only fulfil their purpose if they are secure;
otherwise, they represent a single point of failure [9], exposing
users to security vulnerabilities.
Most existing studies of security risks have focused on
cloud- and browser-based password managers, with only a few
focused on local or desktop password managers [10]. Such
studies did not approach password managers’ security risks
from a digital forensics perspective.
Using a systematic analysis approach using context dia-
grams [11], we elicit potential risks from the phenomena ex-
posed between the contextual domains involving desktop pass-
word managers and their interfaces to the operating systems
through residual data left on the computer when or after the
user exercises some features of the software machine. Then,
(i) we conduct a series of forensic investigative experiments
to test whether these candidate risks can materialised into
realist impact; (ii) we mimicked ordinary users for the design
of scenarios using a Black-box testing approach, without
touching the internal implementation of the software, such
that the risks have a higher likelihood of occurrence. After
the forensically-sound investigations, the paper reports on
vulnerabilities detected simply from the use of three popular
local-based password managers. We selected three popular
and widely used local password managers, namely, KeePass
version 2.28 [12], Password Safe v.3.35.1 [12] and RoboForm
7.9.12 [13].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II provides background information on different types
of password managers, and on the local password managers
selected for the study. Section III presents related work in
terms of reported security issues for password managers.
Section IV describes the design of this study. Section V
discusses results, while Section VI draws conclusions and
provides some recommendations.
Note that this work assumes legitimate use of the studied
password managers. The analysis of encryption algorithms
used by the studied password managers is out of scope for
this study.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Password Managers
As mentioned in Section I, password managers are designed
to reduce the likelihood of compromise derived from reused
and weak passwords that create a domino effect. There are
three types of password managers available for users, each
type has its own advantages and disadvantages, and its own
method of storing, managing and protecting the data they are
entrusted with.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic context of use and typical
components of password managers. Users have to remember
a master password to authenticate to different applications or
services. The password manager’s engine (algorithms) uses a
specific encryption method to store passwords and correspond-
ing authentication details on a database.
1) Cloud-based Password Managers: Password managers
such as LastPass and 1Password are cloud-based. Although
installed locally, they have the ability to synchronise to the
cloud, i.e., they store saved passwords on a cloud storage
server. Storing data this way enables users to have access to
their data wherever and whenever they wish [14]. Due to this
ubiquitous characteristic, cloud-based password managers are
the most commonly used [14]. Similar to other password
managers, they have the ability to generate passwords. By
doing so, the manager can provide complex and unique
passwords for different services and websites.
Cloud-based password managers use extensions to work
alongside users’ browsers. These extensions allow the pass-
word manager to auto login and auto-populate authentication
details to reduce the chances of attacks that involve user
participation [9].
2) Browser-based Password Managers: Google Chrome,
Firefox, Internet Explorer (IE), Safari and Opera – all of these
browsers offer their own built-in password managers. Each
browser has a method of storing and securing data, and works
differently depending on the Operating System that is being
used. Browser managers offer a limited number of features
when compared to other types. They do not offer a complex
password generator or secure login capabilities [15].
On a Windows-based machine, Chrome, IE and Safari
use Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to encrypt all
passwords stored in their password databases. The encryption
used by DPAPI is linked with the users’ Microsoft Windows
account password which acts as the user master password [15].
Using this method of encryption, Chrome, IE and Safari ensure
that the password database is secure from being viewed in
plain text, without the need for the user to set their own master
password.
On a MacOSX machine, however, these browsers rely
upon Apple’s Keychain service to encrypt the contents of the
databases. Similar to the DPAPI, the user login password is
used as the default master password, and to change it, the user
must do so manually and thus is unlikely to be done by the
average user [15].
On a device with a Linux-based OS, Chrome automati-
cally chooses whether it will encrypt the databases contents
either with GNOME Keyring or KWallet. If neither is avail-
able, Chrome stores the passwords unencrypted and in plain
text [15].
3) Local-based Password Managers: Local password man-
agers are a combination of browser- and cloud-based password
managers. The features they offer share similarities with the
former, and the storage method is the same as the latter [10].
Several local password managers are open source, meaning
that they are free to use although they tend to have a reduced
amount of features when compared to cloud password man-
agers. However, open source offers a unique possibility for
user input and code scrutiny by the community. This means
that the development of the manager is constantly growing and
adapting to the needs of its users [16].
Besides the additional custom tools available, local pass-
word managers also have the additional benefit of allowing
their users the options of exporting their database of passwords
to other devices (e.g., another desktop), or simply onto a mem-
ory stick. However, this feature does not make their databases
as ubiquitous as a cloud password manager. The option of
exporting databases may be seen as either a security feature
or vulnerability, depending on how they are transported [16].
Nevertheless, local password managers may be viewed as less
exposed than the cloud and browser types and preferred by
security-conscious users and SMEs.
B. Selected Local Password Managers
This section provides a brief overview of the selected
password managers.
1) KeePass: KeePass 2.x is a multi-award winning [17]
locally stored password manager, released in November 2003;
it is hosted on sourceforge.net [18]. Unlike other password
managers, KeePass openly encourages downloading multiple
plugins developed by other users to allow a larger set of fea-
tures [19]. Unlike KeePass 1.x which used the Twofish encryp-
tion algorithm, KeePass 2.x protects data with a AES/Rijndael
128 bit encryption [20]. The version of KeePass used for our
experiments was version 2.28.
2) RoboForm: RoboForm is a multiplatform password
manager that operated both on a cloud and local modes. Robo-
Form was first released in 1999 and has been continuously
improved since then [21]. This study focused on the local-
based, free RoboForm option – version 7.9.12.
RoboForm allows the selection of encryption algorithm
among the following: AES (128-256 bit), BlowFish (256 bit),
RC6 (256 bit) or 3-DES (64 bit) [22]. Note that RoboForm is
both an online and offline password manager, but the aim of
this study was to examine features available locally, offline.
Fig. 1. Context of use and typical components of password managers.
3) Password Safe: Password Safe is a locally stored open
source password manager; it was first released in 2002. Pass-
word Safe was designed and tested by Bruce Schneier [23].
Password Safe uses the Twofish algorithm to protect the
contents of its database. It uses a limited number of features
to effectively allow users to manage their passwords while
minimising risks [24]. The version tested was 3.35.1.
III. RELATED WORK
Previous work on the security of password managers un-
covered security vulnerabilities by studying the susceptibility
of password managers to theoretically or simulated attacks.
However, none used forensic investigation techniques to draw
conclusions about security, as we did. Most papers focused on
cloud-based or browser-based password managers, although
some papers covered specific features of mobile local-based
password managers as well.
Li et al. [9] analysed the security of five cloud-based pass-
word managers focusing on protocols used for authentication
to a Web application, sharing of passwords with collaborators,
encryption and login bookmarklets. They found vulnerabilities
related to authorisation, user interface, bookmarklets, and sus-
ceptibility to cross-site request forgery and cross-site scripting
(XSS) attacks.
Zhao, Yue and Sun [14] concentrated on two popular cloud-
based password managers: LastPass and RoboForm1. The
authors revealed several security vulnerabilities in both that
could be targeted by an attacker. This study largely focused on
three types of attacks: brute forcing, local decryption attacks
and request monitoring attacks.
The auto-fill policies of browser-based (built-in) password
managers was assessed by many authors, such as [25]–[27].
They found that password leakage is possible via a number of
attacks exploiting this feature; e.g., via XSS attack [25], [26],
phishing [27], and others such as stealth exfiltration, clickjack-
ing, SSLstrip, and redirect sweep [25]. The analysis performed
by Siver et al. [25] covered desktop and mobile browsers, and
five other third party password managers including local-based
KeePass v2.24.
Belenko and Sklyarov [28] analysed the security of 17
local-based password managers in smartphones. Their analysis
1As mentioned in Section II-B, RoboForm can operate in cloud and local
modes, online and offline.
focused on the possibility to launch password recovery attacks
using different techniques (e.g., brute-force, rainbow tables
and GPU crackers) to compromise the master password or
user passwords. They also discussed password recovery speed
since most password managers either adopted a short master
password (e.g., 4-digits) or used a low complexity mechanism
to derive the encryption key, which protects the databases,
from a master password.
Gasti and Rasmussen [10] performed formal analysis of
the security of 9 browser- or local-based password managers
subjecting their password databases to both passive and active
attacks. The studied password managers including the ones
we selected as well, i.e., KeePass 2.x, Password Safe v3 and
RoboForm2. This study showed how the vulnerabilities iden-
tified could compromise the security of almost all databases,
and what they mean in terms of practical attacks.
IV. STUDY DESIGN AND METHOD
In this section we first explain how forensic soundness
requirements are important in eliciting and identifying the risks
associated with the local password managers, then we use a
three phased approach to design test cases to expose such risks.
A. Risk Elicitation and Forensic Soundness
The problem diagram in Figure 2 puts forensic requirement
of analysing the security risks of password managers into the
context of desktop uses. Since the password managers are
used inside a desktop computer, their operations may result in
changes of memory in transient storage, which subsequently
could result in changes in persistent storage when the operating
system is swapping the internal memory with the external
storage. This happens because the memory footprint may be
swapped into the persistent storage when the system is under
heavy load, for example, and in this process the password may
be decrypted.
The forensic test scenarios thus need to be constructed to
analyse these storage through forensic investigations. There
are many machineries for such tasks, e.g., EnCase3 was used.
To confirm these risks, the master password used in the
test scenarios needs to be shown in plain text or recoverable
2However, they used the browser integrated RoboForm.
3https://www.guidancesoftware.com/encase-forensic
Fig. 2. Problem diagram of the forensic soundness requirement in testing candidate risks of local password managers.
to the investigator. Note here we have forensically sound
requirements as follows.
Forensically sound requirement: the evidence derived
from the digital source shall not be tampered by activities
of the investigators. Hence, evidence revealed from the exper-
iments is truly positive. Additionally, the evidence must be
repeatedly reproduced.
The solid arrows in Figure 2 indicate the information
flow amongst the domains, which cannot be modified by the
forensic investigative mechanism, highlighting the importance
of the forensic soundness requirements. In what follows, we
construct a number of forensically sound scenarios to test
whether the master password in plain text or encrypted form
could be revealed from the persistent storage.
B. Phased Testing Approach
We adopted a three phases approach for the study, as
illustrated in Figure 3. Phases 1 and 2 followed a Black-box
testing methodology [29], and phase 3 followed the Event-
based Digital Forensic Investigative Framework by Carrier and
Spafford [30].
The black-box approach, often used for software function-
ality testing, allowed us to create test case scenarios which
exercised features of the password managers from an users’
perspective, without knowledge of their code.
The event-based investigation approach allowed us to un-
derstand the effect of test cases via analysis of residual data.
The methodology was adapted to the purpose of security
vulnerability detection rather than reconstruction of a crime;
this aspect is further elaborated in Section IV-B3. This method-
ology is useful when the investigator knows what to look for.
1) Phase 1: A total of 19 test cases were designed across all
three password managers. The features exercised were some
which could potentially represent security risks outside the
protection of the password managers themselves, but which
were derived from their normal use (sometimes under typical
stressed conditions). Therefore, features like user authenti-
cation, export, print, copy/paste, auto-complete and uninstall
were deemed relevant.
In fact, initially in phase 1, 17 test cases were designed.
However, when a test case revealed an interesting development
in phase 3, if required, other test cases were developed to
further investigate an issue. This happened with test cases
K7 (KeePass) and P3 (Password Safe). In Figure 3, this is
illustrated by the arrow from phase 3 to phase 1.
In summary, the test cases covered the following.
• KeePass
– Test cases K1-K4: These test cases aimed to exercise
different methods for user authentication. Access to
the database of passwords can happen via a master
password, an encryption key file, a jpeg image file,
and/or the Windows account user password.
– Test cases K5 & K6: These test cases aimed to
exercise the export feature. Such feature allows a
complete database to be moved into a different
password manager or another device. The database
of passwords can be exported in different formats,
e.g., HTML and XSL.
– Test case K7: This test case aimed to exercise the
print feature. Such feature allows an user to print
the database of passwords in plain text. The test
case tested a successful and unsuccessful database
printout. Test case 7.1 was later created to test an
unsuccessful followed by a successful printout.
– Test case K8: This test case aimed to exercise the
password manager uninstall feature to check whether
Fig. 3. Three phases approach adopted for the study.
its traces were totally removed.
• Password Safe
– Test case P1: This test case aimed to exercise dif-
ferent methods for user authentication. Access to the
database of passwords can only happen via a master
password.
– Test case P2: These test cases aimed to exercise
the export feature. Such feature allows a com-
plete database to be exported to PSX format, or
users/groups/folders to be exported to CSV or XML
formats.
– Test case P3: This test case aimed to exercise the
clipboard feature. Such feature allows the user to
momentarily copy password or username which can
then be pasted elsewhere. The test case forces a hard
shutdown. Test case P3.1 was later created to test a
soft (graceful) shutdown.
– Test case P4: This test case aimed to exercise the
password manager uninstall feature to check whether
its traces were totally removed.
• RoboForm
– Test case R1: This test case aimed to exercise dif-
ferent methods for user authentication. Access to the
database of passwords can only happen via a master
password.
– Test case R2: This test case aimed to exercise the
print feature. Such feature allows each sub-feature
to be printed individually; e.g., a user can print any
or all of their “safe notes” or individual identities.
– Test case R3: This test case aimed to exercise the
auto-complete feature. Such feature allows conve-
nient login to applications and services using cre-
dentials stored in the database of passwords.
– Test case R4: This test case aimed to exercise
the clipboard feature. Such feature allows easy
copy/paste of sensitive data. The test case explored
this feature for users’ “safe notes”.
– Test case R5: This test case aimed to exercise the
password manager uninstall feature to check whether
its traces were totally removed.
2) Phase 2: Phase 2 involved two steps: (1) the creation of
virtual machines and (2) the execution of test cases.
One baseline virtual machine was generated for each pass-
word manager using VMWare Wokstation 9. All these base-
lines were configured with 1 processor, 60GB hard disk, 1GB
RAM, and Windows 7 Operating System. Each baseline was
then cloned to create a controlled (i.e., isolated and tamper-
free), identical environment for the execution of each test case
for a specific password manager. Once each of the virtual
machines were created, they were saved in separate folders
to reduce the risk of any virtual machine having its data
altered accidentally. This ensured compliance to best practices
of digital evidence handling (i.e, the ACPO principles [31]
adopted in the UK) and sustained forensic soundness of the
study.
Each test case was then executed on a separate virtual
machine using fictitious data. Those virtual machines became
input for phase 3.
3) Phase 3: We used EnCase v7.10.00.103 tool for the
forensic examination performed in phase 3, according to the
Event-based Investigative Framework [30].
In the System Preservation and Documentation phase, hash-
ing allowed validation of whether the evidence had not been
tampered with, and was error free. Each virtual machine
was separately added as an evidence file to EnCase, which
automatically checked its integrity (acquisition hash vs. ver-
ification hash). Contemporaneous notes were kept along the
investigation of each virtual machine.
The System Evidence Searching and Documentation phase
followed a four steps approach according to the methodology:
(1) target identification, (2) data extraction & interpretation, (3)
data comparison, and (4) knowledge update. Step 1 identified
target objects by searching for fictitious data created during
the execution of test cases (e.g., a specific master password).
Step 2 examined the evidence to understand events related
to targets: causes, effects and/or sequencing of events that
led to a specific stage after the execution of a test case.
Step 3 compared test case actual results and expected results,
identifying security vulnerabilities. Step (4) built hypotheses
about those vulnerabilities, i.e., what happened and how they
happened.
The Digital Evidence Reconstruction and Documentation
phase was used to test hypotheses created on the previous
phase, and ensure the reliability of results. Once a security
vulnerability was identified and understood in the previous
phase, the specific test case was re-executed and re-examined
using a clean virtual machine cloned from the password
manager’s baseline to check whether results were reproducible.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents and discusses results from the elic-
itation of risks (elaborated in Section IV-A), and from the
forensic analysis of the test cases executed (elaborated in
Section IV-B). The potential risks identified from the context
diagram analysis are presented in Table I.
TABLE I
RISKS OF EXPOSING MASTER PASSWORD TO POTENTIAL ATTACKS
Risk Phenomena Description Impact Likelihood
r1 Read master password
from the persistent stor-
age created by using the
local password manager
master
password
stored in
plain text
High High
r2 Read master password
from the persistent stor-
age created by using the
local password manager
master
password
in
encrypted
form
Low High
r3 Read master password
from the transient stor-
age created by using the
local password manager
master
password
stored in
plain text
High Low
r4 Read master password
from the transient stor-
age created by using the
local password manager
master
password
in
encrypted
form
Low Low
r5 Read master password
after modifying the local
password manager
master
password
in plain
text
High Extremely
Low
r6 Read master password
after modifying the local
password manager
master
password
in
encrypted
form
Low Extremely
Low
The test cases shown in Table II are the ones revealing
unexpected results uncovering security vulnerabilities in the
selected password managers, which actually confirm the risks
identified in Table I.
A. KeePass vulnerabilities
K1 test case (Table II) revealed that, when the computer’s
memory capacity is low, KeePass’ master password gets stored
within pagefiles in the hard drive. Pagefiles are used as an
extension of the computer’s RAM when a software requires
more memory than the computer can provide. Via keyword
search in EnCase, it was possible to identify the master
password within the pagefile (C\pagefile.sys) in plain
text. After an investigation into this problem it became clear
that this vulnerability had already been raised for KeePass
v2.13 in a discussion forum [32].
As mentioned in Section IV-B2, the tests were carried out
in a virtual machine with 1GB of RAM, which is indeed
very limited for current configurations of standard desktops
and laptops. By default the size of a pagefile in Windows
7 is identical to the RAM size, and can grow up to 3
times the RAM size or 4GB, whichever is larger [33]. More
extended tests are required to establish whether there is a RAM
size threshold in which the issue stops occurring. Windows
pagefile.sys can be reconstructed with tools like the
Pagefile Collection Tool (PCT), proposed by Lee et al. [34].
PCT can parse a live NTFS system and reconstruct a pagefile,
potentially allowing a hacker access to the user’s Keepass
database.
Test cases K5, K6 and K7 revealed that, unlike Password
Safe or RoboForm, KeePass does not require the user to re-
enter the master key for security clearance before an export
or print request is processed.
According to test cases K5 & K6, the exported HTML file
contained the database in plain text, and could be viewed in
a browser (Google Chrome and Internet Explorer were used
for testing). A natural follow-up action by the user, once the
HTML file exported is copied somewhere else (e.g., to a USB),
would be to delete it from the machine. However, analysis
in EnCase showed that the HTML file can be located in
the Recycle Bin (C\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21...), and
remains readable even after it was supposedly emptied, i.e.,
after the user confirmed the message “Are you sure you want
to permanently delete this file?”.
Test case K7 revealed that KeePass database print feature
creates a temporary HTML file with the unencrypted database
content; this temporary file is stored within a Temp folder (e.g,
C\Users\100209537\AppData\Local\Temp\YX63N
TC.htm). The problem arises when the printing does not
complete, even due to trivial reasons such as lack of paper
or the print job is cancelled. This causes the HTML file,
supposedly temporary, to remain stored in the Temp folder.
Follow-up test case K7.1 confirmed that, upon successful
completion of database print, the temporary HTML file is
deleted. However, upon unsuccessful print, it remains in the
Temp folder even after KeePass is closed. KeePass FAQ
page [35] documents that the temporary file gets erased when
“closing the database”, i.e., closing KeePass (no version is
mentioned). The behaviour observed in our tests is different
but raises the same kind of opportunities for an attacker.
B. Password Safe vulnerability
Test case P3 revealed that a hard (improper) shutdown pro-
cedure may expose sensitive data saved to the clipboard. The
shutdown was simulated by suspending the virtual machine
running Password Safe after the user copied a database entry
to the clipboard, before pasting it somewhere else. Keyword
search in EnCase showed that the copied entry (in this case, a
password) could be found saved unencrypted in the page file
(C\pagefile.sys).
One way in which Password Safe could solve this vul-
nerability is by following RoboForm’s example and use a
“safe folder” to temporarily store the copied-to-clipboard data
encrypted.
TABLE II
TEST CASES WHICH UNCOVERED SECURITY VULNERABILITIES REPRESENTING RISKS (TEST CASES – K: KEEPASS, P: PASSWORD SAFE; R: ROBOFORM)
Test
Case
Password
Manager
Test Description Expected Result Actual Result (confirmed risks)
K1 KeePass Database is populated and
secured with a master pass-
word.
Data will remain fully
secured within the
database.
When RAM is limited, the master password can
be found in the Windows page file (hidden page-
file.sys) in plain text. (r1)
K5/K6 KeePass The user specific database
is exported using each of
the features offered.
Despite the format,
data will be exported
encrypted.
No security clearance was enforced before the
export started; the database exported in HTML for-
mat was unencrypted and could be easily viewed
in plain text via browser; it also remained in the
Recycle bin after the user’s request to permanently
delete it. (r1)(r4)
K7 KeePass Database print feature se-
lected but the printing pro-
cess is forced to fail.
No residue of the failed
printing will remain in
the system.
No security clearance was enforced before the print
started; the database print file could be located in
the Temp folder in plain text after it failed to print.
(r1)
K7.1 KeePass (follow-up from previous
TC) Database print fea-
ture is selected again, how-
ever, this time the printing
process completed success-
fully.
Database will print and
no residue of it will re-
main.
The new database was deleted from the Temp
folder after successfully printed; however, the un-
successfully printed database file (see K7) re-
mained in the Temp folder in plain text. (r1)
P3 Password
Safe
Data is copied to the clip-
board and, once the data
has been copied, the com-
puter is subject to a non-
graceful shutdown.
The copied data will be
deleted from the clip-
board.
The data copied to the clipboard remained stored
in the Windows page file (hidden pagefile.sys) of
the computer in plain text after the computer was
rebooted. (r1)
R1 RoboForm Database of passwords is
populated and secured with
a master password.
Data will remain fully
secured within the
database.
When RAM is limited, the master password can
be found in the Windows page file (hidden page-
file.sys) in plain text. (r1)
C. RoboForm vulnerability
As it happened with KeePass, test case R1 revealed
that, if RoboForm is running on a machine with a limited
amount of RAM, it stores sensitive data to the page file
(C\pagefile.sys). RoboForm uses the concept of “iden-
tity”’ to hold authentication and payment details. The data
stored within the page file of the computer included several
pieces of sensitive information for the test identity created,
i.e., name, address, credit card number, pin number and email.
The page file size, as mentioned in relation to KeePass, was
1GB. Further tests are required to evaluate whether there is a
threshold size attached to this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper reported on the use of digital forensic investi-
gation as an instrument for security risk assessment of local
password managers KeePass, Password Safe and RoboForm
(offline version), upon testing features and conditions which
represented potential risks. The study revealed the following
risks that are confirmed to be vulnerabilities:
• With a RAM of 1GB, the master password for KeePass
and identity details for payment using RoboForm can be
found unencrypted in the page file.
• The exported database in KeePass remains in the recycle
bin even when users confirm its permanent deletion.
• Upon unsuccessful printout of KeePass database due to
trivial reasons, the unencrypted database remains in the
Temp folder even after closing the application, which
does not happen upon successful printout.
• Unencrypted sensitive data copied to clipboard using
Password Safe can be found in the page file after re-
booting from a hard (non-graceful) shut down.
Although some vulnerabilities are bound to special condi-
tions, they still put users at risk since malware already started
to exploit password managers. E.g., the version of Citadel
malware identified by IBM in 2014 was able to recognise the
use of password managers KeePass and Password Safe, and
trigger a keylogger [36]. The hacking tool KeeFarce [37] is
able to dump KeePass database to a file accessible to a hacker,
when a user is logged-in. Tools like PCT [34] can parse a live
NTFS system and reconstruct a page file. Such malware and
tools demonstrate that the risk posed by vulnerabilities, such
as the ones uncovered by this study, is real.
The study also allowed us to compare and contrast the
behaviour of these three password managers. This lead us to
the following recommendations: (i) KeePass should adopt the
practice by Password Safe and RoboForm, and require security
clearance in the format of authentication before processing
database export and print, and (ii) Password Safe should adopt
the practice by RoboForm and encrypt content copied to the
clipboard. Adopting a forensic approach to security evaluation,
our perspective can expand beyond OS attacks, which was the
focus of previous password manager security studies.
Most conditions triggering the identified risks are likely to
happen, e.g., users often shut machine down before closing
password managers. To mitigate these risks, we suggest the
developers of these tools to learn from each other to prevent
similar test scenarios from leaking the master passwords.
Packaged as virtual machines, such test scenarios described in
this work could allow regression for the improved password
managers.
There are many interesting possibilities for future work.
Since the test cases were not exhaustive and not many features
were tested, the study scope in terms of test case coverage
could be extended or other systems could be examined.
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